The Interim Core of a Bayesian Pure Exchange Economy by Ichiishi, Tatsuro & Yamazaki, Akira
Hitotsubashi University Repository
Title
The Interim Core of a Bayesian Pure Exchange
Economy






RightTHE INTERIM CORE OF A
BAYESIAN PURE EXCHANGE
ECONOMY
Tatsuro Ichiishi∗ and Akira Yamazaki†
September 2002
Abstract
Nonemptiness of the interim Bayesian incentive-compatible core
of a Bayesian pure exchange economy is established.
∗Department of Economics, The Ohio State University, and Graduate School of
Economics, Hitotsubashi University. Email: ichiishi@economics.sbs.ohio-state.edu and
ichiishi@econ.hit-u.ac.jp
†Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University. Email: yamazaki@econ.hit-
u.ac.jp
11 Introduction
A Bayesian pure exchange economy is a pure exchange economy in which the
consumers are asymmetrically endowed with information about their prefer-
ence relations and initial endowments. A strategy in a Bayesian pure ex-
change economy is a plan which speciﬁes a net trade for each state.1 We
adopt Harsanyi’s (1967/68) type-proﬁle approach, so a state is deﬁned as
a type proﬁle. A strategy bundle is endogenously determined as a solution
of the game played by the consumers. A strategy bundle is synonymously
called a mechanism, so the theory endogenously determines a mechanism.
After the consumers determine a mechanism, they execute it in the interim
period, that is, each consumer chooses his particular net trade according to
the plan when he knows his own type but not the others’. A solution is called
interim if it is determined in the interim period. It is called ex ante if it is
determined in the ex ante period.
Wilson (1978) initiated analysis of cooperative behavior in a Bayesian
pure exchange economy, and proposed as interim solution concepts the coarse
core concept and the ﬁne core concept. He established nonemptiness of the
coarse core, and also provided an example of an economy with an empty ﬁne
core.
Subsequent researchers paid particular attention to two basic conditions
that a strategy needs to satisfy, in that the members of a coalition only de-
sign a strategy bundle which satisﬁes these two conditions. One condition,
originally proposed by Radner (1968) in a diﬀerent context, is the informa-
tional feasibility. It is the requirement that each plan be measurable with
respect to the information structure available to the consumer at the time of
his strategy-execution. Yannelis (1991) considered the private information
case deﬁned as the situation in which only the private information structure
will be available to each consumer at the time of strategy-execution. A strat-
egy bundle satisfying the informational feasibility for the private information
case is called private measurable.
Another condition is the requirement that a strategy bundle be truth-
fully executed, namely d’Aspremont and G´ erard-Varet’s (1979) Bayesian
incentive compatibility. Ichiishi and Idzik (1996) introduced this require-
1 Some works deﬁne a plan as a function which speciﬁes a consumption bundle for each
state, or as a pair of a net-trade plan and a communication plan, but the present paper
does not consider these strategies.
2ment into a generalized core analysis, and deﬁned the ex ante Bayesian
incentive-compatible core as the core in the private information case in which
each possible coalition designs a private measurable and Bayesian incentive-
compatible strategy bundle in the ex ante period.
Our study object in the present paper is the interim analogue of the
ex ante Bayesian incentive-compatible core. Besides the obvious merit of
satisfying the two basic conditions, it enjoys the strong properties that it is
essentially as ﬁne as the ﬁne core, and that the grand coalition and all possible
blocking coalitions are treated symmetrically (a property which the coarse
core and the ﬁne core fail to satisfy). Here, by saying symmetric treatment,
we are expressing our understanding that consumers form either the grand
coalition or any possible blocking coalition in the same way, in order to jointly
determine a strategy bundle for pursuit of their self-interest. Our main result
is that a Bayesian pure exchange economy with concave and weakly monotone
state-dependent von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions has a nonempty
interim Bayesian incentive-compatible core.
We remark, however, that this positive result is unlikely to be extended
beyond the pure exchange economy.
For a survey of the works on ex ante cores of a Bayesian pure exchange
economy, see, e.g., Ichiishi and Yamazaki (2002, subsection 3.5).
2 Model and Result
We study a pure exchange economy with l commodities and n consumers
in which consumers are asymmetrically endowed with information about
the data of the economy. Let N be the set of n consumers, and let N
(:= 2N \ {∅}) be the family of nonempty coalitions. In accordance with
Harsanyi’s (1967/1968)’s framework of the Bayesian game, let T j be a ﬁnite
set of consumer j’s types. The type-proﬁle space for each coalition S is then
given as T S :=
 
j∈S T j. Set for simplicity, T := T N.A m e m b e r o f T is
synonymously called a type proﬁle or a state. The interim period is deﬁned
here as the period during which each consumer j knows his true type tj ∈ T j
but not the others’. His private information structure, denoted by T j,i st h e
algebra on T generated by the sets, {tj}×T N\{j}, tj ∈ T j.
Given type proﬁle t, each consumer is characterized by his consump-
tion set Rl
+, his state-dependent von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
3uj(·,t):Rl
+ → R, his initial endowment vector ej(tj) ∈ Rl
+, and his interim
probability πj(·|tj)o nT given tj. We are assuming here that the initial
endowment function ej depends only on tj, in other words, ej (when viewed
as a function on T)i sT j-measurable. If the consumers commonly hold an
objective ex ante probability π on T,c o n s u m e rj’s interim probability is
given by the Bayes’ rule,
π







π(¯ tj,tN\{j}), if tj = ¯ tj,
0, otherwise,
but our present framework allows for subjective probabilities, and even incon-
sistency among interim probabilities (in that there is no ex ante probability
to which the Bayes’ rule can be applied in order to derive the interim prob-
abilities).









is an economy with l commodities, where N is a consumer set, and for each
consumer j, T j is his type set, Rl
+ is his consumption set, uj : Rl
+ ×T → R
is his type-proﬁle-dependent von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, ej :
T → Rl
+ is his initial endowment function, postulated to be T j-measurable,
and πj(·|tj)i sh i sinterim probability on the states T given tj.
We analyze consumers’ cooperative behavior during the interim period.
When type proﬁle t prevails, consumer j chooses his net trade vector zj(t)
(∈ Rl). Any set S of consumers can come together and jointly schedule a
net-trade plan zS := {zj}j∈S, so that the plan is individually feasible,







∀ t ∈ T :
 
j∈S
zj(t) ≤ 0. (2)
4Consumer j’s net-trade plan zj : T → Rl is his strategy.2 Denote by F S the
set of all feasible strategy bundles for coalition S:
F
S := {z
S : T → R
l·#S | z
S satisﬁes (1) and (2)}.
Not all plans in F S can actually be chosen. We discuss two basic con-
ditions that a plan has to satisfy. We are studying consumers’ behavior in
(what the literature has called) the private information case, that is the pri-
vate information structure T j is the information structure available to j at
t h et i m eo fj’s action (choice of net trade). The ﬁrst condition, therefore,
stipulates that a plan be informationally feasible in this case; to be precise,
∀ j ∈ S : zj is T j-measurable. (3)
Ap l a nzS satisfying condition (3) is called private measurable. Denote by
F  S the set of all feasible, private-measurable strategy bundles for coalition
S:
F




The second condition pertains to the feasibility of execution of strategy
bundles viewed as “contracts” made within a coalition. Suppose that the
members of coalition S agree to take a strategy bundle zS ∈ F  S.L e t¯ tj be
consumer j’s true type. If he makes a choice according to the agreement, his


















j(t | ¯ t
j).
In the private information case, however, he can make any choice cj ∈
zj(T j)\{zj(¯ tj)} contrary to the agreement, yet his colleagues S \{j} cannot
catch this betraying act, being led to believe that j’ st r u et y p ew e r ei nt h e
event (zj)
−1 (cj). If j makes such a choice, his interim expected utility given

















j(t | ¯ t
j).
2 It is important that j’s strategy is his net-trade plan zj. Some models postulate that
j’s strategy is his consumption plan, t  → zj(t)+ej(tj), but we cannot obtain the existence
result (the main result of this paper) with this alternative deﬁnition of strategy.
5The members of the coalition decide on plan zS, in order to realize the
choice bundle zS(t)a te a c hp o s s i b l et y p ep r o ﬁ l et.I fm e m b e rj does not act
according to the agreed plan, taking advantage of his private information, the
required outcome zS(¯ t) cannot be achieved and the purpose of the coalition
formation is not fulﬁlled. To guarantee realization of the exact execution
of an agreement, the members of the coalition agree only to those plans
zS which nobody has an incentive to act contrary to. In short, they agree
only to the Bayesian incentive-compatible plans. To be precise, the Bayesian




j : Euj(zj + ej | tj) ≥ Euj(zj(˜ tj)+ej | tj). (4)
Notice that unlike Vohra (1999), there is no mediator in our model, since
we are modelling the reality in which the members of a coalition seldom
consult with an outsider (mediator) in carrying out their own agreement.





 S | z
S satisﬁes (4)}.
We remark that 0 ∈ ˆ F S, in particular each set ˆ F S is nonempty.
The consumers play a cooperative game during the interim period. An
interim Bayesian incentive-compatible core net-trade plan is a strategy bun-
dle of the grand coalition N upon which no coalition can improve regardless
of any possible type proﬁle:
DEFINITION 2.2 An interim Bayesian incentive-compatible core net-trade
plan of a Bayesian pure exchange economy Epe is a strategy bundle z∗ such
that
(i) z
∗ ∈ ˆ F
N;a n d
(ii) it is not true that
∃ S ∈N: ∃ t
S ∈ T
S : ∃ z
S ∈ ˆ F
S :









Condition (i) in deﬁnition 2.2 is the feasibility of the plan z∗ (via the grand
coalition), and condition (ii) is the coalitional stability condition.
6The main result of this paper is the following existence theorem. A func-
tion f : Rl
+ → R is called weakly monotone, if
[c,c
  ∈ R
l
+,c ≤ c
 ] ⇒ f(c) ≤ f(c
 ).
THEOREM 2.3 Let Epe be a Bayesian pure exchange economy. Assume for
each consumer j that his von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function uj(·,t)
is continuous, concave, and weakly monotone in Rl
+ for every t ∈ T.T h e n
there exists an interim Bayesian incentive-compatible net-trade plan.
REMARK 2.4 In our proof of theorem 2.3 (section 3), we show the ex-
istence of an interim Bayesian incentive-compatible core net-trade plan z∗




∗j(t)=0, for every t ∈ T,
while allowing for the broad range of strategies (the weak inequality (2)) for
all possible blocking coalitions. 
REMARK 2.5 Vohra (1999)’s example of an empty Bayesian incentive-
compatible coarse core is crucially based on his postulate that for a plan
zS of coalition S, each strategy zj is a function of tS ∈ T S, rather than of
tj ∈ T j. Vohra’s setup requires the presence of a mediator who, by collecting
private information, enlarges the set of possible blocking strategies, thereby
making coalition-formation easier. 
3 Proof of Theorem 2.3
An interim private core net-trade plan of a Bayesian pure exchange economy
Epe is a strategy bundle z∗ that satisﬁes all the conditions of deﬁnition 2.2
(interim Bayesian incentive-compatible core net-trade plan) in which the sets
ˆ F S are replaced by F  S, S ∈N.
The idea of our proof of theorem 2.3 is to (1) construct an auxiliary
economy in agent form Ea associated with the economy Epe, (2) prove the
existence of a core net trade z∗ of Ea, by applying Scarf’s (1967) theorem
on a balanced game, (3) show that z∗ is also a private core net-trade plan
of Epe, (4) show the existence of a private core net-trade plan z∗∗ of Epe for
7which
 
j∈N z∗∗j(t) ≡ 0, by applying Ichiishi and Radner (1999, lemma 6.3,
page 330), and (5) show that z∗∗ is also Bayesian incentive-compatible, by
applying Hahn and Yannelis (1997, proposition 6.10, page 401).
Selten (1975) deﬁned the game in agent normal form associated with an
extensive game. An agent controls only one information set (so diﬀerent in-
formation sets of a player are controlled by diﬀerent agents), his pure strategy
set is the same as the choice set for the given information set, and his utility
function is the same as the utility function of the player who controls the
information set. We apply this idea to the present model of Bayesian pure ex-
change economy. In Selten’s work on equilibrium reﬁnement, the concept of
agent’s conditional expected utility given his information set plays a central
role. In the present work on an interim solution, the concept of agent’s con-
ditional expected utility given his type plays a central role; roughly stated,
realization of a type determines an information set.3
An agent of economy Epe is deﬁned as a consumer together with his type,
(j,tj); denote by A the set of all agents,
A := {(j,t
j) | j ∈ N,t
j ∈ T
j}.
An economy in agent form Ea is deﬁned as a particular static pure ex-
change economy:
DEFINITION 3.1 The economy in agent form associated with Bayesian








with l commodities, where A is the agent set, and for each agent (j,tj), Rl
+ is
his consumption set, Euj(·|tj):Rl
+ → R is his utility function, and ej(tj)
(∈ Rl
+) is his initial endowment vector.
The attainability condition for economy in agent form Ea is, however, de-
ﬁned diﬀerently from the conventional one: A net trade bundle {z(j,tj)}(j,tj)∈A
of Ea is called feasible in the grand coalition,i f
∀ (j,t










(j,tj) ≤ 0. (6)
3 To be precise, we are making only an analogy to Selten’s procedure. In fact, unlike
in the extensive game, coalition S’s feasible choice set is not the cartesian product of
individual consumers’ feasible choice sets in the pure exchange economy.







    {z
(j,tj)}(j,tj)∈A satisﬁes (5) and (6)
 
.
A feasible, private-measurable strategy bundle of Epe is characterized as
a feasible strategy bundle in the grand coalition of Ea. Indeed, z ∈ F  N
corresponds to {zj(tj)}(j,tj)∈A ∈ G.
We next re-deﬁne the interim coalitional stability condition for the private
core of Epe, using the concept of agents. An admissible blocking coalition in
economy in agent form Ea is a coalition of agents in which at most one agent
represents each consumer; denote by B0 the family of all admissible blocking
coalitions,
B0 := {B ⊂ A | [(i,t
i),(j,t
j) ∈ B,t
i  = t
j] ⇒ i  = j}.
For B ∈B 0,l e tS(B) be the set of those consumers represented by the agents
B,




Then, the coalitional stability condition on a strategy bundle {z∗(j,tj)}(j,tj)∈A
of Ea is deﬁned as follows; it is seemingly diﬀerent from the conventional
coalitional stability condition.
¬∃B ∈B 0 : ∃ z
S(B) ∈ F
 S(B) :









Interim blocking with a feasible, private-measurable strategy bundle of
coalition S in Epe is characterized as blocking in Ea with a strategy bundle in
F  S(B) for some B ∈B 0 for which S = S(B).
We thus have the following re-formulation:
PROPOSITION 3.2 A net-trade plan z∗ is an interim private core net-
trade plan in Bayesian pure exchange economy Epe,i fa n do n l yi ft h en e t
trade bundle {z∗j(tj)}(j,tj)∈A is a core net trade bundle of the economy in
agent form Ea associated with Epe.
9To apply Scarf’s theorem for nonemptiness of the core, deﬁne the non-









∃ zS(B) ∈ F  S(B) : ∀ (j,tj) ∈ B :
u(j,tj) ≤ Euj(zj(tj)+ej(tj) | tj)
 
if B ∈B 0,






   
 
 
∃{ z(j,tj)}(j,tj)∈A ∈ G : ∀ (j,tj) ∈ A :
u(j,tj) ≤ Euj(z(j,tj) + ej(tj) | tj)
 
.
The sets V (B) are the sets of utility allocations attainable in blocking coali-
tions B ∈ 2A \ {∅}.T h es e tH is the set of utility allocations attainable in
the grand coalition A.
Let χB ∈ RA be the characteristic vector of subset B of A. A subfamily






Game (V,H) is called balanced, if for every balanced subfamily B of B0,
 
B∈B
V (B) ⊂ H.
Proof of Theorem 2.3. We ﬁrst show that the non-side-payment game
(V,H) derived from the economy in agent form Ea is balanced. Indeed, this
is done in the same way as Scarf (1967) has shown that the game associated
with a pure exchange economy is balanced: Choose any balanced subfamily
B of B0, with the associated balancing coeﬃcients {λB}B∈B,a n da n yu ∈
 
B∈B V (B). For each B ∈B , there exists {z(B,j))}j∈S(B) ∈ F  S(B) which gives
rise to {u(j,tj)}(j,tj)∈B. Deﬁne ¯ zN by ¯ zj(tj): =
 
B∈B:B (j,tj) λBz(B,j)(tj). It is
easy to show that ¯ zN gives rise to u,a n dt h a t
 
j∈N ¯ zj(tj) ≤ 0 for every t.
Consequently, u ∈ H, so game (V,H) is balanced.
By Scarf’s (1967) theorem, there exists a core net trade bundle z∗ of Ea.
By proposition 3.2, it is also a private core plan of Epe.
By Ichiishi and Radner (1999, lemma 6.3, page 330), there exists private-
measurable plan z∗∗ : T → Rl·#N such that










10In view of the weak monotonicity of each uj(·,t), z∗∗ is also a private core
plan of Epe.
According to the plan z∗∗, total use of resources is exactly the same as
the total initial resources for every t ∈ T. Therefore, by Hahn and Yannelis
(1997, proposition 6.10, page 401), z∗∗ is Bayesian incentive compatible. 
4 Information-Revelation through Coalition
Formation
Consumer j’s very act of joining a coalition may reveal (a part of) his private
information, so condition (ii) of deﬁnition 2.2 (coalitional stability condition
for a interim Bayesian incentive-compatible core net-trade plan) may be
inappropriate. This observation has been known among the researchers of
the present research area as a folklore (see, e.g., Ichiishi and Yamazaki (2002,
subsection 3.2.2)).
The following proposition clariﬁes a rather speciﬁc case in which such
information revelation does not inﬂuence the consumers’ ﬁnal decision on
coalition formation; essentially, it is the situation in which information on
the other consumers’ types T S\{j} is irrelevant to j’s interim expected utility.
PROPOSITION 4.1 Let j ∈ S. Assume the T j-measurability of j’s strate-
gies. Assume also the no-externality, that is, uj depends only on (cj,t j) ∈
Rl
+ ×T j. Then, revelation of information on T S\{j} does not aﬀect j’s deci-
sion in regard to joining coalition S.












Suppose that willingness of the members S \{ j} to choose zS reveals infor-












So, consumer j’s decision in regard to whether or not to accept zS instead of
any other plan z†S does not change after obtaining information A. 
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